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Hybrid Jury Strikes
Aliza Plener Cover*
Modern jury selection is pulled in two directions. Equal protection prohib-
its racial discrimination, but the traditional peremptory strike permits exclusion
of a juror without explanation. To reconcile this tension, the Court developed
the Batson framework, requiring lawyers to articulate ex post race-neutral justi-
fications for suspicious trikes. But many doubt Batson's efficacy at uncovering
latent discrimination. During the 2015-16 term, while recognizing a Batson
violation in Foster v. Chatman, the Supreme Court counter-intuitively reinforced
this concern. Foster is the rare case in which prosecutors documented in writing
their reliance on race. A framework that depends on such transparency is weak
and ineffective. And the systemic persistence of discrimination, three decades
after Batson was decided, has convinced many that the only solution is to elimi-
nate peremptory strikes in their entirety.
In this Article, I offer an alternative strategy. I introduce a new mechanism
to reform - but not entirely eliminate - the system of peremptory challenges:
the "hybrid jury strike." Hybrid strikes would fall in between traditional per-
emptory challenges, which may be exercised at the party's discretion, and chal-
lenges for cause, which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of juror
bias or other basis for disqualification. Hybrid strikes would require ex ante
justification but not a conclusive showing of bias; they could be used to exclude
a set number of jurors who survived non-pretextual and meaningful cause chal-
lenges. Hybrid strikes could replace traditional peremptories wholesale or
could be leveraged asymmetrically - for example, by preserving traditional
peremptories for the defense while permitting only hybrid strikes for the
prosecution.
Hybrid strikes offer an intermediate approach between the status quo and
complete abolition of peremptory challenges. They would meaningfully curtail
discrimination while preserving the most legitimate function of peremptory chal-
lenges: to foster jury impartiality by providing a buffer zone for cause chal-
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INTRODUCTION
This past term, in Foster v. Chatman,I the Supreme Court handed down
a Batson2 victory to a black death-row inmate who was convicted and sen-
tenced to death for the murder of a white woman by an all-white jury after
the prosecution struck every qualified black member of the venire.3 The
prominence of this case had little to do with the novelty of the legal question
presented; the case was resolved through a relatively straightforward appli-
cation of legal principles announced in Batson and its progeny. Rather, the
blatancy of the state's race-consciousness during jury selection made this
case disturbing enough on its facts to grab the Supreme Court's attention:
The prosecution's trial notes were riddled with unambiguous indicators of
race-based decision-making. On the prosecution's venire lists, for example,
black jurors' names were marked with a "B" and highlighted green.4 On the
prosecution's copies of the questionnaires filled out by prospective jurors,
the race of black jurors was circled.' While it is certainly possible that Fos-
ter should have prevailed in his Batson appeal even without such explicit
evidence,6 the Court stressed the importance of the overt race coding when
' 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
'Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1742; Brief of Petitioner at 2, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(2016) (No. 14-8349) ("Timothy Tyrone Foster, an eighteen-year-old African-American, was
charged in 1986 with killing Queen Madge White, an elderly white woman, in Rome, Geor-
gia."). Interestingly, the Court's opinion in the case never mentions the race of the defendant
or the victim.
4 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744.
' Id. There were several other indications of race-consciousness in the record, including a
draft of an affidavit prepared by an investigator at the prosecutor's request which contained the
following race-conscious text ultimately omitted from the court filing: "If it comes down to
having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay. This is solely my opinion
. . . . Upon picking of the jury after listening to all of the jurors we had to pick, if we had to
pick a black juror I recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors." Id. (citation omitted).
Handwritten notes referred to black venire members as "B #1," "B #2," and "B #3." Id. On
two lists of the jurors who were qualified during voir dire, all five remaining black jurors were
marked with a notation to be struck. Id. Five of the six qualified jurors on a list of "definite
NO's," were black. Id. Another document contained a note which read "NO. No Black
Church." Id. (emphasis in original).
6 The Supreme Court evaluated and rejected the race-neutral reasons proffered by the
prosecution for striking two of the black jurors by drawing a side-by-side comparison of these
black jurors to white jurors who were similarly situated but were not struck, and by pointing to
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ruling in his favor.' And it is difficult to imagine that the case would have
garnered four justices' support for a grant of certiorari without such dramatic
documentary evidence.
While the opinion was an essential victory for Foster personally and an
important symbolic statement from the Supreme Court against the race-
based exclusion of jurors, the atypical facts limit the opinion's relevance to
the larger systemic problem of discriminatory jury selection processes. Fos-
ter, the anomalous case in which prosecutors documented their consideration
of race during jury selection, provided a forum for the Court to proclaim its
commitment to racial equality, without being forced to confront the flaws in
the Batson regime that allow for racial bias to persist in the run-of-the-mill
case.' Foster does little to decrease the chance that prosecutors will make
race-based peremptory challenges in the future; instead, it largely functions
as a reminder not o leave behind written evidence of such misconduct. Fos-
ter is an individual success masking systemic failure. It props up Batson's
appearance of efficacy by highlighting its ability to succeed in rooting out
racism in the rare case where that racism is explicit.
The Batson success story told by the Foster Court reveals no inkling of
Batson's deficiencies - which, as many commentators have noted, and as I
explain in more detail below, are substantial. Concurring in Batson, Justice
Marshall foretold the futility of its framework in eradicating systemic race
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes;9 many judges, scholars,
and advocates have come to agree with him.'0 The Batson test allows prose-
cutors to strike minority jurors" if, when challenged, they can point to a
minimally plausible race-neutral reason for the exclusion that withstands a
"the shifting explanations [and] the misrepresentations of the record" in the prosecutor's justi-
fications, in addition to the evidence of race coding. Id. at 1754.
' Id. at 1755 ("The contents of the prosecution's file, however, plainly belie the State's
claim that it exercised its strikes in a 'color-blind' manner. The sheer number of references to
race in that file is arresting." (citation omitted)).
' Others have argued that Batson itself functioned in the same symbolic way. See, e.g.,
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 153, 199 (1989).
1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The deci-
sion today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.").
'0 See infra note 73.
" Today, the Batson framework also constrains the race-based exercise of peremptory
strikes by defense attorneys, see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992), and against
jurors of any race, see, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2008). It
also applies in the civil context, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616
(1991), and to strikes on the basis of gender, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129
(1994). My primary critique of Batson, however, lies in its failure to eradicate prosecutorial
use of peremptory strikes to rid criminal juries of minority jurors. This prosecutorial miscon-
duct has particularly pernicious effects on the criminal justice system's fairness and legitimacy,
and poses a special danger to the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. I describe these
claims in more detail below.
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low level of judicial scrutiny.12 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is growing evi-
dence that prosecutors still use peremptory strikes at vastly disproportionate
rates against black prospective jurors, and generally suffer no consequence
for doing so." Some critics - including Justice Marshall - have argued
that the only way to truly eliminate the exercise of peremptory strikes on the
basis of race is to eliminate peremptory strikes altogether, or at least to end
their exercise by prosecutors. But this argument has, in turn, been criticized
as both unrealistic and undesirable because peremptory strikes, while vulner-
able to abuse, serve as a long-standing and important protection against juror
bias. Other reformers have advocated more modest avenues to strengthen
the Batson standard or modify voir dire procedures.14 Yet the Supreme
Court has stayed true to the Batson model, expanding it into new territory"
without pausing to reconsider whether it has achieved its underlying goals.
In this Article, I offer a new mechanism to reform - but not entirely
eliminate - the system of peremptory challenges so as to limit the improper
use of race-based strikes. I argue that traditional peremptory challenges
should be replaced, either wholesale or on an asymmetrical basis, with "hy-
brid jury strikes" - challenges that lie between successful cause challenges
and traditional peremptory strikes.'" Like a traditional peremptory strike, a
hybrid strike could be exercised on a discretionary basis without success-
fully establishing that a juror must be excluded for bias or other cause. But
unlike a traditional peremptory strike, a hybrid strike could only be exer-
cised after the ex ante articulation of a race-neutral and meaningful argument
for exclusion. This innovation preserves the essence of the two most legiti-
mate interests asserted in favor of peremptory challenges: providing a pen-
umbral protection against jurors who have true bias and improving party
confidence in the legitimacy of the trial. But, in order to curtail racial dis-
crimination in jury selection, the hybrid strike abandons the effort to serve
other asserted interests, such as the parties' gut-level satisfaction with the
2 I write "minimally plausible" even though, as will be discussed below, the race-neutral
reason articulated at step two of the Batson test does not even need to meet that low standard.
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). However, when
the judge decides at step three whether the strike is pretextual, an utterly implausible rationale
may be rejected.
3 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
15 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (extending Batson framework to strikes exercised on the basis of
gender); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (finding standing for defendant to chal-
lenge peremptory strikes violating equal protection rights of different-race jurors); Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 616 (extending Batson framework to civil jury system); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59
(extending Batson framework to race-based strikes by defense counsel). The Ninth Circuit
recently extended Batson to strikes based on sexual orientation. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014).
'6 It is worth clarifying that, although in my model hybrid jury strikes would grow closer
to challenges for cause, I do not advocate eliminating cause challenges. Rather, I propose




composition of the jury. The hybrid jury strike is a feasible way of achiev-
ing significant improvements.
Part I provides a background on Batson and its progeny and summa-
rizes some of the critiques of its regulatory regime and reforms proposed to
date. Part II advances the new model of hybrid jury strikes and explains
how their incorporation into jury voir dire would remedy some of the most
problematic deficiencies in the current peremptory system while preserving
some of its most important virtues. Part III explores some of the considera-
tions involved in implementing this proposal, including the continuing role
for a modified Batson in regulating hybrid strikes and possible asymmetrical
applications between the prosecution and defense.
I. BATSON's WEAK REGULATION OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES
In Batson and its progeny, the Court established a three-step process for
adjudicating claims of racial and gender" bias in the exercise of peremptory
strikes.'" At step one, the moving party must make out a prima facie case of
impermissible discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory strike.'9 At
step two, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to offer a race- and
gender-neutral explanation for the contested strike.20 Although it must be
"clear and reasonably specific,"21 this explanation need not be "a 'persua-
sive, or even plausible,' one."22
At step three, the court evaluates whether the moving party has satisfied
her burden of proving discrimination.23 In determining whether the race-
and gender-neutral explanation is pretextual, the trial court may consider
information including the demeanor and credibility of the party defending
17 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (holding that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality"). In this Article, I focus more heavily on the problem of
race discrimination rather than gender discrimination, particularly because of the extensive
documentation of persistent disproportionate strike rates along racial lines. To the extent that
gender-based strikes are similarly difficult to identify and eradicate under the J.E.B. frame-
work, my proposal of hybrid jury strikes would similarly help to address that problem.
" During jury selection, attorneys and/or the judge question the members of the jury pool
in a process that culminates in the empanelment of a petit jury. Although the exact procedures
vary in different jurisdictions, during voir dire, attorneys may move to strike jurors for cause if
their responses to questioning demonstrate concrete, legally-specified bases for disqualifica-
tion. Attorneys generally may also utilize a set number of discretionary challenges called
peremptory challenges (also called peremptory strikes or simply peremptories). For a helpful
and more in-depth explanation of how peremptory strikes fit into voir dire proceedings, see,
e.g., David C. Baldus et. al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 3, 10-15 (2001).
" Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552
U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008)); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quoting Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94, 96 (1986)).
20 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97).
' Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20).
22 Id. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)
(per curiam) and id. at 766 ("'mustaches and the beards look suspicious'")).
23 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1747 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476-77).
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the strike,24 the implausibility or speculative nature of the asserted neutral
explanation,25 misrepresentations about the record in articulating the expla-
nation,2 6 the number or percentage of prospective jurors struck of a particular
race or gender,2 7 and the existence of similarly-situated venire members of a
different race or gender who were not struck.28
In mandating this three-step process, the Court sought to root out invid-
ious discrimination from jury selection while leaving the peremptory strike
largely intact. In particular, the Court left undisturbed two key features of
the historical peremptory strike: first, that it may be exercised irrationally, as
long as not on the basis of race or gender; and second, that absent a prima
facie case of discrimination, it may be exercised without he articulation of
any explanation for its use.
Batson's asserted goals are laudable and compelling. The Court has
identified three interests served by regulating peremptory challenges against
discrimination: the participatory and equality rights of the individual ex-
cluded jurors;2 9 the defendant's equal protection right to an impartial jury
"whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria";3 0 and
the community's interest in a fair and impartial criminal justice system.3 1
Decisions following Batson have at times prioritized the first interest and at
other times the second. Batson itself was limited on its facts to the prosecu-
tor's race-based exercise of peremptory strikes against jurors who shared the
minority race of the defendant.3 2 The primary focus in Batson was on the
24 Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)
(plurality opinion)).
25 See, e.g., id. at 482.
26 See, e.g., Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1749-51 (analyzing how the prosecutor's race-neutral
reasons misrepresented the record and concluding that an "independent examination of the
record, however, reveals that much of the reasoning provided by Lanier has no grounding in
fact").
27 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, at 240-41 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003)) ("The numbers describing the prosecution's use of peremptories are
remarkable. Out of 20 black members of the 108-person venire panel for Miller-El's trial, only
1 served. Although 9 were excused for cause or by agreement, 10 were peremptorily struck by
the prosecution. 'The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible
African-American venire members .... Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity."'
(citations omitted)).
28 Id. at 241 ("More powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side compar-
isons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve. If a
prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-
similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful dis-
crimination to be considered at Batson's third step."); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-84
(conducting a side-by-side comparison of the struck African-American juror and two unstruck
white jurors).
29 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
30 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
11 Id. at 87.
32 Id. at 82-83 ("Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on charges of second-
degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods . . . . The prosecutor used his peremptory chal-
lenges to strike all four black persons on the venire, and a jury composed only of white persons
was selected."); id. at 86 ("The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the
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defendant's own equal protection rights,33 though the Court also recognized
the broader harm done to the community by racially discriminatory jury se-
lection, in "undermin[ing] public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice."3 4
Subsequent cases clarified that Batson's salutary goals extended beyond
the defendant. The Court in Powers v. Ohio explained:
In Batson, we spoke of the harm caused when a defendant is tried
by a tribunal from which members of his own race have been ex-
cluded. But we did not limit our discussion in Batson to that one
aspect of the harm caused by the violation. Batson "was designed
'to serve multiple ends,"' only one of which was to protect indi-
vidual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors.
Batson recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community
at large."
Thus Batson was expanded to apply to peremptory strikes exercised against
jurors of a different race than the defendant,3 6 to jury selection in civil
cases,3 7 and to peremptory strikes exercised by the defendant." The consti-
tutionally-aggrieved persons in these cases included the struck jurors them-
selves, who had a right not to be excluded from service on the basis of their
race,39 and their constitutional rights trumped the defendant's non-constitu-
tionally-protected interest in securing a jury he considered optimal.40
Batson's tripartite objectives are particularly important today, and it is
worth scrutinizing how well Batson is achieving them. We are at a historic
moment of intense scrutiny into how racial discrimination impacts the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system. There is a crisis in community confi-
dence in the criminal justice system, particularly among communities of
color.4 1 We have experienced a divisive national discourse on the discrimi-
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.").
" Id. at 85-87 ("But the defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose mem-
bers are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. The Equal Protection Clause guaran-
tees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on
account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not quali-
fied to serve as jurors. Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a
defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure.") (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 87-88.
35 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 415.
* Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
* Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
* Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
40 See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57-59 (finding no harm to defendant's constitutional inter-
ests when Batson was extended to protect against race-based peremptory challenges by the
defense).
41 For example, a 2015 Harvard survey found that "nearly 1 in 2 18-29 year olds do not
have confidence that justice system is fair" and that views differed strongly by race: 66% of
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natory impact of stop-and-frisk policies,42 and we have seen the rise of the
Black Lives Matter movement in response to multiple publicized police
shootings of unarmed African-American men.43 We have seen critical atten-
tion to the phenomenon of racially disparate mass incarceration44 and some
long-awaited traction in sentencing reform.45 Much of this national scrutiny
into race has fallen upon policing practices - the point of entry into the
criminal justice system - and sentencing practices - the endpoint of the
criminal trial. The jury system, at the midpoint, could have a salutary or
exacerbating impact on the perceived and factual inequality of the system
blacks, 53% of Hispanics, and 43% of whites had not much or no confidence. HARVARD
PUBLIC OPINION PROJECT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SURVEY OF YOUNG AMERICANs' ArriTUDES
TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE 7 (Apr. 29, 2015), http://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/
filesnew/IOPSpringl5PollExecSumm.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/MQD3-YUF3. A
June 2016 Gallup poll found that only 23% of Americans have "a great deal" or "quite a lot"
of confidence in the criminal justice system. GALLUP, AMERICANS' CONFIDENCE IN INSTITU-
TIONS STAYS Low (June 13, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/192581/americans-confidence-
institutions-stays-low.aspx?g-source = Politics&gmedium =newsfeed&g-campaign =tiles,
archived at https://perma.cc/XL7E-2XX6. The Department of Justice has issued several re-
ports on communities with deep distrust of the police and criminal justice system, including
one on Ferguson, Missouri. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5-6 (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/0
4/fergu-
son-police-departmentjreport.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8WKQ-K4VB ("Our investi-
gation has shown that distrust of the Ferguson Police Department is longstanding and largely
attributable to Ferguson's approach to law enforcement. This approach results in patterns of
unnecessarily aggressive and at times unlawful policing . . . . The confluence of policing to
raise revenue and racial bias thus has resulted in practices that not only violate the Constitution
and cause direct harm to the individuals whose rights are violated, but also undermine commu-
nity trust, especially among many African-Americans."). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in
Utah v. Strieff, powerfully described the disproportionate and degrading impact of unconstitu-
tional police actions on people of color. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070-71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). See also Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public
Confidence in the Fairness ofJury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1177, 1194-95 (1994) (summarizing polling showing "disparities in perceptions of [criminal
justice] fairness between African-Americans and whites").
42 See, e.g., Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worth-it/358644/,
archived at https://perma.cc/BL7B-62EN.
4 See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed, arch-
ived at https://perma.cc/7SP8-TSSF.
" See generally, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE
NAACP CONFERENCE (Jul. 14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/
14/remarks-president-naacp-conference, archived at https://perma.cc/AQ7L-DE5Q;
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-
BLINDNESS (2010).
45 See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010)
(reducing the disparity in punishment of crack and powder cocaine); Sentencing Reform and
Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2016) (bipartisan bill that would have, among
other things, reduced certain mandatory minimums for drug and gun offenses; and that, al-
though ultimately unsuccessful, evidenced increased efforts by legislators from both parties to
tackle sentencing reform); Nathaniel Herz, Landmark criminal justice bill heads to Gov.
Walker'sdesk, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (May 13, 2016), http://www.adn.com/politics/article/
landmark-criminal-justice-legislation-will-head-alaska-gov-walkers-desk/2016/05/13/, arch-
ived at https://perma.cc/2GKP-92E8.
2017] Hybrid Jury Strikes 365
overall.46 When the jury is stripped of minority jurors through the race-
based exercise of peremptory strikes, compounding damage is done to crimi-
nal justice legitimacy, for the jury - the structural bulwark erected by the
Constitution between the citizen and governmental tyranny - appears
rigged against minority defendants.47 Perceived legitimacy aside, diversity
can have a concrete impact on the quality of jury decision-making. A lack
of minority representation on a jury may embolden racist discourse and de-
crease the quality of deliberation in the jury room.48 In capital trials of black
defendants accused of killing white victims, the presence of even a single
black male on the jury has been shown to substantially decrease the likeli-
hood of a death sentence.49 Protecting against race-based peremptory strikes
- and their tendency to diminish minority representation in the jury box -
serves the individual constitutional rights of criminal defendants to a fair and
equal trial; reaffirms the worth of minority jurors who may feel, in other
ways, devalued and disserved by the criminal justice system; and fosters
some measure of confidence in the community at large about the fair admin-
istration of justice.
The Batson reality, however, has failed to live up to its ideals. Batson
does something, but quite simply not enough, to root out the invidious ef-
fects of race discrimination in jury selection. Studies in multiple jurisdic-
46 I say this even though I recognize the diminishing role of the jury in the criminal justice
system overall. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is
Vanishing, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-tri-
als-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2Q8T-
5GR6; Suja A. Thomas, The Missing Branch of the Jury, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 2787426, archived at https://perma.cc/K7UK-
35MR. The criminal jury trial itself has become a rare occurrence, as "[n]inety-seven percent
of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas." Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143 (2012) (citations omitted). Under such circum-
stances, one could argue that protracted attention to the process of jury selection fails to mean-
ingfully increase the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. The vanishing jury and its
impact on the democracy, equality, and legitimacy of criminal punishment lies beyond the
scope of this paper, but it is important to note how the decline of the jury in a world of
racially-disparate policing and mass incarceration poses a special danger to the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system.
4 See, e.g., Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composi-
tion: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1033, 1049 (2003) (reporting
on empirical study and concluding that "[w]hen the jury was racially heterogeneous, [the]
verdict did not influence ratings of the trial's fairness. However, when the jury did not include
minority members, observers viewed the trial as less fair when it produced a guilty verdict than
when it produced a not guilty verdict.").
48 Jerry Kang et. al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1180-81
(2012) (asserting that "in a more diverse jury, people's willingness to express explicit biases
might be muted, and the very existence of diversity might even affect the operation of implicit
biases as well" and summarizing a study which concluded that racially diverse juries have
higher quality deliberations) (citing Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group De-
cision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006)).
49 William J. Bowers et. al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis
of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 171, 193
(2001).
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tions have convincingly shown that prosecutors continue to exercise
peremptory strikes at significantly disproportionate rates against blacks com-
pared to whites.50 Despite these disparities, prosecutors making reverse Bat-
son challenges to defense attorney strikes against white jurors have
sometimes had more success in the courts than defense attorneys challenging
prosecutors' strikes.51
Even when peremptory strikes are utilized disproportionately against
minority jurors, it remains difficult to prevail on a Batson challenge.52 Bat-
son's second step sets a low bar, as the race-neutral reason for the strike need
not be "'persuasive, or even plausible." 53 Even when paired with step
three, which requires a judicial assessment of discriminatory intent, this per-
missive standard makes it easy for savvy (or even not-so-savvy) prosecutors
5 See URSULA NOYE, BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE CADDO PARISH DISTRICT ATrORNEY'S OFFICE, REPRIEVE
AUSTRALIA 9 (Aug. 2015), https:/Iblackstrikes.com/resources/BlackstrikesCaddoParish-Aug
ust_2015.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KE3Q-KQAX (finding, in a decade-long study of
preemptory strikes in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, that "Caddo parish prosecutors exercised per-
emptory challenges against black prospective jurors at more than three times the rate at which
they exercised peremptory challenges against white prospective jurors"); RICHARD BOURKE,
JOE HINGSTON & JOEL DEVINE, BLACK STRIKEs: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, LoUI-
SIANA CRISIS ASSISTANCE CENTER (2003) (finding, in a study of peremptory strikes in Jeffer-
son Parish, Louisiana, that "prosecutors chose to strike black prospective jurors at more than
three times the rate of whites"); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 14 (Aug. 2010) http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20
Race%20and%2OJury%20Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/QMR5-2GCP (citing high
strike rates of African-Americans by prosecutors in counties in Alabama and Georgia, and
resulting capital trials by all-white juries); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Stub-
born Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson
North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REv. 1531, 1533-34 (2012) (finding, in a study of
"how prosecutors exercised peremptory challenges in capital trials of all defendants on death
row in North Carolina as of July 1, 2010," that "[olver the twenty-year period we examined,
prosecutors struck eligible black venire members at about 2.5 times the rate they struck eligi-
ble venire members who were not black."). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
268-69 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I am not surprised to find studies and anecdotal
reports suggesting that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges re-
mains a problem.").
' Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Per-
emptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 465 (1996) ("[I]t is noticeable that Batson
respondents are less successful in generating acceptable explanations for peremptory chal-
lenges exercised on the basis of gender or against whites, as compared with peremptory chal-
lenges exercised against blacks or Hispanics.").
52 See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 269 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Bidish Sarma,
First Impressions: When Will Race No Longer Matter in Jury Selection?, 109 MICH. L. REV.
69, 72 (2011) ("[T]he dearth of recent cases in which courts have actually found racial dis-
crimination in jury selection suggests not that such discrimination doesn't occur, but that the
judiciary has failed to identify and remedy it."); see also Baldus, supra note 18, at 34-35. In
the Baldus study, the authors concluded from the data that the Batson line of cases "had, at
best, only a marginal impact on the peremptory strike strategies of each side" and that surpris-
ingly few Batson challenges were even made despite extensive evidence of disparate strikes.
Id. at 123.
s See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514
U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)); see also Purkett, 514 U.S. at 766 ("'[Miustaches and the
beards look suspicious."').
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to strike jurors with near impunity.54 Prosecutors who wish to exclude Afri-
can-Americans from the jury can list infinite reasons for striking those ju-
rors, some of which are closely-linked proxies for race. Prosecutors may
object to a black juror on account of her church activities," residence in a
high-crime neighborhood,56 type of employment,7 or manner of dress.58
Even easier, prosecutors may assert that a struck juror looked down while
answering questions, seemed evasive (or nervous, or too eager), or hesitated
before answering questions." Perhaps the struck juror was the wrong age,60
or not married,61 or divorced.62 Perhaps, in the attorney's view, the juror
lacked intelligence.63
5 Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More Than the
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075,
1093 (2011) (finding that, in a study of 269 federal decisions from 2000-2009, "prosecutors
regularly respond to a defendant's prima facie case of racially motivated jury selection with
tepid, almost laughable 'race-neutral' reasons, as well as purportedly 'race-neutral' reasons that
strongly correlate with race. More significantly, we found that courts accept those reasons as
sufficient to establish the absence of a racial motivation under Batson, and almost without
exception, those reasons survive subsequent scrutiny in the federal courts . . . . Our study
suggests that the Batson response is as ineffective as a lone chopstick." (citation omitted)).
" E.g., State v. Jacobs, 32 So. 3d 227, 235 (La. 2010) ("Louisiana courts have found [to
be] ... a valid race-neutral reason ... a prospective juror's involvement in church activities.").
SE.g., Smith v. State, 448 S.E.2d 179, 181 (Ga. 1994) ("[T]he State's justification for
the exercise of its peremptory strikes was the result of a racially-neutral belief that all re-
sidents, black or white, of a particular neighborhood might be biased against the State's wit-
nesses. The prosecutor simply inferred that the two prospective jurors were more likely to
have had direct exposure to gang activity than someone who did not live in their
neighborhoods.").
" E.g., United States v. Carter, No. 04-0404, 2006 WL 1128740, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr.
24, 2006) (accepting as race-neutral a strike based in part on the juror's unemployment); Craw-
ford v. Zon, No. 04CV34, 2005 WL 857056, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2005) (accepting as
race-neutral a strike based in part on the juror's "occupation as a night club manager"); Carter
v. Duncan, No. C 02-0586SBA, 2005 WL 2373572, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2005) (ac-
cepting as race-neutral a strike based in part on the juror's employment by the post office).
5 E.g., Carter, 2006 WL 1128740, at *2 (accepting as race-neutral the reason that "the
venireperson was wearing baggy clothes that did not fit and a hat inside the courtroom"); State
v. Crawford, 873 So. 2d 768, 783 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding denial of Batson challenge
where the prosecutor made "comments that she did not like the way Mr. Taylor was dressed
and that he 'looked like a drug dealer"' and citing State v. Banks, 694 So. 2d 401, 408 (La. Ct.
App. 1997), "where the prosecutor stated that he was excluding a potential juror because, inter
alia, he was wearing gold jewelry and dressed in a T-shirt").
* E.g., Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 300 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that "the unfavorable
demeanor of a venireperson has been held to be a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory
challenge" and citing cases).
60 E.g., Crawford v. Zon, No. 04CV34, 2005 WL 857056, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2005)
(accepting as race-neutral the reason that one juror was "too young").
6' E.g., Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (accepting as race-
neutral reasons that struck jurors were "unmarried" and had "no children").
62 E.g., Cole v. Roper, No. 4:05CV131, 2007 WL 1460460, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 16,
2007) (striking juror in part because he was divorced).
63 The opportunity for invidious racial stereotyping in reaching this conclusion about lack
of intelligence should be obvious. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 54, at 1097 (finding, upon
a review of cases, that "[a] prosecutor's vague reference to the 'intelligence' of a venireperson
... often withstood a Batson challenge even when the estimation of intelligence was not based
on educational level, language barriers, IQ, vocabulary, Jeopardy winnings, or any other speci-
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While a side-by-side comparison of struck jurors of one race against
unstruck jurors of another race might make these justifications less credible
and susceptible to rejection at step three, a competent prosecutor can readily
articulate a series of weak but individualized, race-neutral reasons to strike
any juror, because there is always a vast menu of identifiable characteristics,
and combinations thereof, to choose from - occupation (or unemployment),
age (too old or too young), education (too much or too little), familial status,
residence, dress, speech, gestures, lack of eye contact, and so on. None may
be particularly relevant to jury service, or particularly persuasive, but all are
race-neutral and good enough for Batson. Because peremptory strikes may
ordinarily be exercised for any purpose - including an irrational one - the
bar for defeating a Batson challenge is necessarily low. An objectively weak
reason for striking a juror can defeat a claim of pretext, even when race is a
more plausible explanation for the prosecutor's choice because the very pre-
mise of a peremptory strike is that it can be exercised without a strong objec-
tive justification.
Indeed, the very inequalities in the criminal justice system that make
jury diversity so important also, perversely, create formally race-neutral jus-
tifications for the exclusion of minorities under Batson. The cycle of dispa-
rate enforcement and distrust between law enforcement and minorities
makes it more likely that (a) prosecutors will want to strike minority jurors,
and (b) they will have formally race-neutral reasons for doing so. Because
communities of color have a disproportionate rate of contact with law en-
forcement,6 4 and because much of that contact leads to disillusionment with
the criminal justice system," prosecutors will often perceive - and success-
fully strike - minority jurors as distrustful of law enforcement or skeptical
of the prosecution's case.66 The very inequality of the criminal justice sys-
fied way of gauging the venireperson's ability to follow the trial" and citing Williams v. Norris,
576 F.3d 850, 863-65 (8th Cir. 2009), as an egregious example).
' These disparities extend to law enforcement contact on the streets and rates of incarcer-
ation and probation. For example, New York City police "conducted an astounding 4.4 mil-
lion stops between January 2004 and June 2012 .... In about 83 percent of cases, the person
stopped was black or Hispanic, even though the two groups accounted for just over half the
population." Editorial Board, Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 12,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk
.html?_r=0, archived at https://perma.cc/KAK5-JRM4. In 2014, the United States population
was 13% black. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POP-
ULATION BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN FOR THE UNITED STATES, STATES, AND COUN-
TIES: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2015, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, archived at https://perma.cc/6S8S-H595. However,
"37% of the male prison population" was black, E. ANN CARSON, UNITED STATES DEP OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 (Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pl4.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8GNG-98W7, and 30% of probationers
were black, DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 (Nov. 2015), http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppusl4.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/PUD5-8EUZ.
65 See supra note 41.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding the lower
court's denial of a Batson motion where the struck juror, who was Hispanic, recounted exper-
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tem provides cover for prosecutors to strike minorities on ostensibly race-
neutral reasons.7 For example, if more black citizens than white citizens are
stopped and frisked or hassled by the police, prosecutors who question the
venire about these interactions will find more "race-neutral" excuses to
strike black jurors than white jurors. One commentator has recently advo-
cated that jurors' arrest records should not qualify as race-neutral reasons
under Batson for precisely this reason.68
Moreover, Batson provides little protection against implicit bias. Ex-
tensive social science research in recent decades has documented the preva-
lence of implicit racial bias, including by people whose consciously-held and
professed beliefs are egalitarian.69 Because of implicit bias, even a well-
intentioned attorney who outwardly condemns racism may act upon latent
stereotypes that cause her to perceive African-Americans as unfavorable ju-
rors.0 Particularly because peremptory strikes may be exercised based on
gestalt, "seat-of-the-pants"7' impressions, cognitive schemas that impact at-
torneys' gut-level responses to people of different races will impact whether
they perceive minority jurors as "good" or "bad" jurors for their side. And
because Batson sets a low bar for explaining the reasons for the strike, even
if a prima facie case of discrimination is made out, such actions are easy to
defend after the fact.
Batson's inadequacy in the face of race-based peremptory strikes was
predicted from the moment of its inception. Justice Marshall, who con-
curred in the judgment handed down in Batson, argued that nothing short of
the abolition of the peremptory strike would cure the problem of its race-
based use.7 2 Others following him have similarly called for the elimination
of peremptory strikes altogether," or have sought to asymmetrically abolish
iencing excessive force by the police during voir dire, since possible "prejudice[ ] against law
enforcement officers" was a race-neutral reason for the strike).
67 See, e.g., Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 300-01 (2d Cir. 2005) (approving the prosecu-
tor's "general practice in exercising peremptory strikes during voir dire" of striking, in drug
cases, "jurors who had family members who had either been arrested or undergone negative
experiences with the police" or who "harbored negative feelings about the police").
6" Vida Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates
Batson, 34 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 387, 391 (2016).
69 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 949 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law
of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 975 (2006); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Uncon-
scious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 181-82 (2005).
70 Page, supra note 69, at 208 ("A challenge may, however, have been caused by a racial
or gender-based stereotype that affected the way the attorney (decision-maker) processed in-
formation about the potential juror. In this case, the stereotype, or schema, acted as an implicit
theory that affected how the attorney perceived, registered, stored, assigned meaning, and
remembered information about the venire person, all without the attorney's awareness or inten-
tion.); see also Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 795, 819 (2012).
7' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
7 Justice Breyer, concurring in Miller-El, examined Batson's deficiencies and called for
the Court to "reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Judge Mark
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peremptory strikes by prosecutors while reserving their exercise for criminal
defendants.74 Some have suggested pairing abolition with other systemic
modifications, such as expanded voir dire proceedings and a lower standard
of proof for cause challenges.75
Others have opposed eliminating peremptory strikes, both as detrimen-
tal to important principles of justice and as impractical to achieve.76 Most
convincingly, proponents of peremptory strikes have explained that they
provide a "margin of protection" against selection of biased jurors by serv-
ing as a fallback when challenges for cause are rejected77 or when sufficient
evidence of bias cannot be amassed due to the inherent limitations of the
question-and-answer voir dire process.78 Peremptory strikes have also been
defended as enhancing the parties' confidence in the verdict by facilitating
their participation in the jury selection process.79 Others have noted that,
whatever the advantages of eliminating peremptory challenges, practical ob-
stacles to that reform make it infeasible.8 0
Commentators have offered a number of reform proposals other than
abolition to try to reduce or eliminate race-based peremptory challenges and
increase diversity on seated juries - including affirmative juror selection
W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of
Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV.
L. & POLY REV. 149, 167 (2010); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be
Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1997); Akhil Reed
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995).
74 E.g., Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1163, 1164-65 (2014); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Elimi-
nate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099,
1147-48 (1994).
1 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1151; Alschuler, supra note 8, at 208; Bennett,
supra note 73, at 151.
76 E.g., Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 772-73 (1992); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, " 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1975); Barbara L.
Horwitz, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury System Lose by Its
Demise?, 61 U. CiN. L. REV. 1391, 1439-40 (1993); Baldus, supra note 18, at 37-38 (summa-
rizing arguments in favor of preserving peremptory strikes).
" Underwood, supra note 76, at 771.
78 Baldus, supra note 18, at 37-38 ("The argument in favor of peremptories focuses pri-
marily on the ineffectiveness of challenges for cause as a vehicle to identify and remove biased
venire members. The first such claim is that many venire members either refuse to admit, or
are unaware of, their biases. The second claim is that the legal standards applied in the evalua-
tion of challenges for cause are excessively lenient in allowing rehabilitation of venire mem-
bers that appear to be biased. The third claim is that courts are more likely to approve
challenges for cause presented by the Government than by the defense; the use of peremptories
by defense counsel, it is argued, is essential to overcome the adverse effects of those rulings.
Finally, it is argued that peremptories are essential when a court rejects a challenge for cause.
Without them, the juror so challenged would likely harbor resentment toward the party who
sought to remove her from the panel.").
7 Underwood, supra note 76, at 771-72.
a Baldus, supra note 18, at 38 ("In spite of the force of the arguments for the abolition of
peremptories, critics have been unable to rally support for their abolition, and little change in
that regard is now expected.").
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rather than (or in addition to) juror strikes;' mandated minority representa-
tion on juries;8 2 a more stringent standard in step two or three of the Batson
test;" increased sanctions for Batson violations;8 4 and a shift to analyze al-
leged race-based strikes under the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury rather than under Equal Protection." One particularly interesting sug-
gestion entails "jural districting," which, borrowing from the model of elec-
toral districting, would seek to achieve a more diverse jury by requiring one
representative from each of twelve geographic sub-districts to be seated on
the jury.86 Reformers have also stressed the importance of expanding voir
dire to facilitate the informed exercise of peremptory strikes on individuated
grounds other than race, gender, and physical appearance.
There is much of value in many of the reform proposals to date, al-
though each proposal also has its weaknesses. I am sympathetic to the call
to eliminate peremptory strikes either in their entirety or, asymmetrically, by
prosecutors, but I am skeptical that an asymmetrical approach - justifiable
as it may be - is feasible given staunch opposition by members of the
bench and bar. And I recognize that peremptory strikes, for all their suscep-
tibility to discriminatory exercise, do serve several functions worthy of pre-
serving. It is with this recognition that I advance a new proposal: the hybrid
jury strike.
II. A NEW MODEL OF HYBRID JURY STRIKES
The logical goal in reforming the system of peremptory strikes should
be to maximize its most beneficial features and minimize its most substantial
81 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury
De Medietate Linguae: A History and A Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REv. 777, 806
(1994) ("I propose to provide each litigant with a certain number of affirmative peremptory
choices, which litigants could use to include their 'peers' within the petit jury.").
82 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1611, 1698-99 (1985) (arguing, before Batson, for a defendant's right to racially similar jurors
and arguing, based on social science research about juror decision-making, that a defendant
should be guaranteed "three racially similar jurors").
83 E.g., Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Demo-
cratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of A Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
63-64 (1988) (suggesting stronger criteria for evaluating both the prima facie case and its
rebuttal); Paul H. Schwartz, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation ofBatson
v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1533, 1567 (1991) ("[W]hen a prima facie
inference of discrimination arises in the Batson context, the court should require the prosecutor
to give at least some objective, verifiable reason for the questioned peremptory challenges.").
' E.g., Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1117-23; Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1740-41 (1977)
8 Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1859, 1867-68 (2015).
8 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 359-60 (1999). For a discussion of this proposal, see
infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
7 Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1179,
1197-1201 (2003) (citing scholarship advocating expanded voir dire, including questionnaires,
and discussing potential impact on implicit bias.); Page, supra note 69, at 254.
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costs. I suggest that the best way of doing so would be to replace traditional
peremptory strikes with so-called hybrid jury strikes. I define hybrid jury
strikes as challenges that could only be exercised after a meaningful, race-
and gender-neutral, and non-pretextual cause challenge was denied. These
strikes would combine certain features of traditional peremptory challenges
with other features of challenges for cause. Today, peremptory strikes may
be exercised on a purely discretionary basis, pursuant to any whim as long as
that whim does not violate equal protection. The reason for the strike is
ordinarily unspoken; it must be articulated only if a prima facie case of racial
discrimination can be established. By contrast, a system of hybrid jury
strikes would require, ex ante and for every challenge, a meaningfu8 race-
and gender-neutral justification that would tend to suggest a genuine risk of
bias or disqualification on the part of the juror. In selecting which jurors to
strike, attorneys would be discouraged from acting on gut instinct and would
be oriented toward eliminating jurors who might be proven biased. How-
ever, the more stringent cause standard would not need to be satisfied; only a
meaningful, not a winning, challenge for cause would be required.
In this section, I focus on the most straightforward way to incorporate
hybrid strikes into voir dire: a one-for-one replacement of traditional per-
emptory strikes with hybrid strikes. In Part III.D, however, I discuss the
possibilities for incorporating hybrid strikes into jury voir dire in different
permutations and on an asymmetrical basis, such as by preserving traditional
peremptory strikes for criminal defendants while restricting prosecutors to
exercising hybrid strikes.
This proposal resonates in some ways with those that have suggested
simultaneously abolishing the peremptory strike and lowering the for-cause
standard," but the hybrid challenge offers three key improvements over an
attenuated for-cause regime. First, it does not require judges to internalize or
" I describe below two possible standards for a "meaningful" challenge: "non-frivolous"
or "substantial."
89 See e.g., Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1134-35 ("If peremptory challenges are eliminated,
I would require the adoption of a new 'expanded for cause' standard for cause challenges.
Under an expanded for-cause standard, judges would be willing to accept challenges on any
basis that would cause a reasonable attorney to be confident that the challenged juror will be
unable to render an impartial verdict: the judge need not (as now) share this belief, but he does
have to find it reasonable rather than based on pure hunch, guesswork, or the desire to elimi-
nate a large swath of society from the jury rather than a specific affiliation which might influ-
ence a juror unduly. (Taxicab drivers, for example, could be struck from a case involving a
taxicab driver, but jurors over forty, or jurors who owned automobiles, or jurors who frowned
when asked about automobiles, could not be struck for those reasons.)"); Alschuler, supra note
8, at 208 ("Abolishing the peremptory challenge might require courts to consider challenges
for cause more carefully and to uphold them more frequently . . . ."); Jonathan B. Mintz,
Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremp-
tory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026,
1042-43 (1987) (advocating for eliminating peremptories while "mak[ing] wider use of the
'catch-all' challenge for cause included in most statutes. . . .[and] always allow[ing] the
attorneys to ask the voir dire questions."); Theodore McMillian, Batson v. Kentucky: A Prom-
ise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REv. 361, 374 (1990); Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and
Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Pro-
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impose a new standard for cause - which may, in practice, devolve back-
ward to the old cause standard or expand, unbounded, toward over-permis-
siveness. In a hybrid system, the judge would be required, in the first
instance, to do what she had always done: assess whether there are adequate
grounds to determine that the juror meets any of the statutory bases for dis-
qualification. If not, the judge would make a secondary determination of
whether the cause challenge was meaningful and non-pretextual. The judge
would not need to endorse the reason for the challenge as ultimately merito-
rious, and would not need to rule that the juror was in fact unqualified.
0
Second, and importantly, hybrid jury strikes would be limited in num-
ber, just as traditional peremptory strikes are today.9' By contrast, relaxing
the for-cause standard would apply to all challenges with unbounded effect.
Under a hybrid strike regime, parties would have the opportunity to chal-
lenge jurors in a select number of instances when they were most convinced
that the judge had failed to recognize bias or other source of disqualification.
But there would be no wholesale diminution of the cause standard - which
could ultimately result in the exclusion of more minority jurors than we see
today.
Third, eliminating peremptory strikes while lowering the cause standard
would leave no recourse against the discriminatory exercise of these
watered-down cause challenges.92 Hybrid jury strikes, by contrast, could be
subject to a modified Batson framework as described in Part III.C, thus pro-
viding an extra layer of protection against pretext and impermissible
discrimination.
cess, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 947, 1003-04 (1994); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremp-
tory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1107-08 (1995).
90 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 206 ("On occasion, unexplained challenges have pro-
vided a gentle way of excluding prospective jurors who probably should not have been permit-
ted to serve. When a prospective juror has told the court that he or she can be impartial,
rejecting this assurance and excluding the juror for cause is likely to seem insulting. In this
situation, the peremptory challenge has permitted both judges and prospective jurors to save
face. Judges have resolved their doubts against exclusion, relying on the peremptory challenge
to correct their errors and to do so without explicitly rejecting the jurors' protestations of
impartiality.").
1' The exception would be a jurisdiction such as Alabama's, which has unlimited peremp-
tory challenges. The parties whittle down the qualified venire by striking jurors until a 12-
person jury is selected. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.4(f)(1).
92 Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How
the Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 607,
653 (2005) (critiquing proposals to lower the cause standard because "there would be essen-
tially no mechanism for addressing one side's pattern of striking potential jurors for illegal
bases. Simply because the strikes would then be done through the for-cause challenge, as
opposed to the peremptory challenge, does not mean that trial counsel would not attempt to
control jury selection as much as possible; instead, there would probably still be instances of
discriminatory intent in for-cause challenges, either conscious or subconscious. With the re-
vised for-cause challenge system, however, there would be no Batson procedure to eliminate
these kinds of strikes.").
3732017] Hybrid Jury Strikes
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 52
The hybrid strike model would preserve some of the most important
interests served by the peremptory strike, while militating against some of its
most perverse effects. I explore these dynamics below.
A. Preserving the penumbral function
The most convincing argument in favor of the peremptory challenge is
what I call its "penumbral function": the buffer zone of impartiality that it
can provide around the imperfect system of challenges for cause. Voir dire
is a necessarily limited forum for unearthing jurors' partiality. Jurors may be
reluctant to voice their biases and prejudices out loud in court - particularly
socially unacceptable ones such as racism or sexism - and those who do
may be formally rehabilitated through follow-up questioning by the judge or
opposing party, yet still harbor partiality. As has been demonstrated by so-
cial science literature on implicit bias, some jurors may not even be aware of
their biases; they may express genuine verbal adherence to egalitarian values
while harboring strong yet unconscious biases.93 Moreover, even when sub-
stantial evidence of partiality exists on the record, judges may be reluctant to
reach a formal, stigmatizing, yet borderline conclusion that a juror is bi-
ased,94 or may simply reach the wrong conclusion that a juror is qualified for
service. More problematically, judges who are more sympathetic to the state
than the defense may rule on defense cause challenges more strictly than on
state challenges.95 For all of these reasons, peremptory challenges create a
penumbra of impartiality. They allow the parties to buffer the judge's rul-
ings on cause challenges, making it less likely that a truly biased juror will
be seated on the jury.
The penumbral peremptory has particular value in light of the substan-
tial discretion afforded trial judges when ruling on for-cause challenges.96
9 See supra note 69.
94 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 206.
9 See Baldus, supra note 18, at 38. The predominance of former prosecutors in the ranks
of judges, both state and federal, contributes to actual or perceived sympathy by some judges
toward the state. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL
DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 8-9 (2016), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/1 1/Professional-Diversity-Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/T4FF-RFE7 (finding
that "126 out of [President Obama's] 300 district court nominees (42.0%) have been state or
federal prosecutors. Forty-five (15.0%) have been state or federal public defenders, while 62
(20.7%) have been private criminal defense attorneys" and "24 out of [President Obama's] 64
circuit court nominees (37.5%) have been prosecutors. Eleven (17.2%) have been private
criminal defense attorneys, and five (7.8%) have been public defenders."). See also Andrew
Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in the U.S. Su-
preme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1995-2001 (2016) (discussing the possible implica-
tions of the of U.S. Supreme Court's shift toward justices with experience as prosecutors).
9 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) ("Reviewing courts are properly
resistant to second-guessing the trial judge's estimation of a juror's impartiality, for that judge's
appraisal is ordinarily influenced by a host of factors impossible to capture fully in the record
- among them, the prospective juror's inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language,
and apprehension of duty" (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1878));
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This discretion seems inevitable - judges are tasked with ruling on multiple
challenges at every trial, some of which may involve credibility determina-
tions that take into account demeanor of jurors and other intangibles that are
difficult to put into the record for appellate review.97 Judges need to be able
to make these determinations with some leeway, or else the finality of every
jury verdict would be cast in doubt. Yet in spite of the need for deference, a
judge's choice to deny a cause challenge, if erroneous, may lead to the seat-
ing of a biased juror and may have serious consequences for the fairness of
the trial. The peremptory challenge provides a partial solution. The harmful
consequences of a discretionary, erroneous denial can be neutralized by a
discretionary, contemporaneous party action rather than by an unlikely ap-
pellate reversal.
Jury selection is a rare scenario in which this type of non-appellate,
bottom-up check on judicial discretion is possible. Each qualified juror,
though unique and worthy of service, is also replaceable with another juror
who is equally unique and worthy of service. Although individual and sys-
temic harm is done when jurors are excluded on the basis of impermissible
discrimination, there is no inherent need or right for any particular juror to
serve on any particular jury. Thus an erroneous denial of a challenge for
cause, which results in the seating of a biased juror, is more harmful than a
peremptory exclusion of a juror whose impartiality is questioned - as long
as that exclusion does not undermine other democratic and constitutional
values, such as racial equality."
The hybrid strike would preserve the essence of this penumbral func-
tion. Of course, it would be more difficult to exclude an actually biased
juror in a hybrid strike regime than in a pure peremptory strike regime, be-
cause hybrid strikes must be supported by valid reasons and may not be
exercised automatically; the judge, rather than the party, would retain ulti-
mate control over their exercise. But the hybrid jury strike would still pro-
vide a safety net around the challenge for cause. If the judge exercised her
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1985) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S.
162, 168 (1950)).
" For example, if a juror retracts a biased viewpoint when rehabilitated during voir dire, it
may be necessary for the judge to assess the credibility of the retraction by evaluating the
demeanor of the juror.
" By contrast, in other situations when judges exercise discretion to grant or deny a
party's motion, the subject of the motion cannot be replicated and a bottom-up check on defer-
ence is less feasible. For example, when judges exercise their substantial discretion under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine whether the probative value of a piece of
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the piece of evidence is
irreplaceable. The trial judge's ruling is binary: the evidence will either come in or it won't.
An appellate court will review that binary and discretionary determination under a highly def-
erential standard. Outside of appellate review, which is unlikely to succeed, there is no vehicle
for the parties to check a judge's erroneous discretionary action. Because jurors, unlike pieces
of evidence, are interchangeable, in the jury selection context the parties can check against
erroneous or unfavorable discretionary judicial action through the exercise of peremptory
strikes, without resorting to a likely losing effort at deferential appellate review. In this way,
the peremptory strike is an unusual and valuable model for checking judicial deference.
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discretion and made a close call denying a challenge for cause, the party
would retain a check on that discretion. The penumbral protection would
simply be narrowed to the cases in which bias was most plausible because
substantial reasons could be garnered in favor of exclusion. The check
would be moderated, but not eliminated, as it would be if the peremptory
challenge were abolished entirely. And through the hybrid strike's narrow-
ing of the buffer zone, there would be fewer "false positives" - situations
in which jurors struck on the basis of an attorney's hunch or stereotype could
actually have served as impartial jurors.
One lingering concern is that the shift to hybrid strikes would diminish
the defendant's ability to enforce his right to a fair trial when faced with a
particularly unsympathetic judge.9 9 If, in practice, judges disfavored defend-
ants when ruling on the permissibility of hybrid strikes, implementing juris-
dictions may wish to consider one of the asymmetrical applications
considered below in Part III.D. 0o Additionally, although reviewing courts
would almost certainly need to give deference to trial judge rulings granting
or denying hybrid strikes,t0' appellate courts should consider any apparent
disparities in the trial judge's rulings on state and defense strikes when deter-
mining if the trial judge abused her discretion.
B. Preserving confidence in trial outcomes
Another argument that has been made in favor of the peremptory strike
is that it promotes the parties' confidence in the outcome of the trial by
providing them with some measure of control and input over the composi-
tion of the jury.102 As I will explain below, in my view the traditional per-
emptory strike only partially serves this interest; in other ways it undermines
it. The hybrid strike would continue to promote party input and confidence,
but in a modified form that would actually enhance confidence in the legiti-
macy of the trial outcome.
9 See Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1143-47.
" Measuring such hostility to the defense would present challenges. However, one can
imagine reviewing voir dire transcripts and demonstrating divergent rulings on similarly meri-
torious defense and prosecution challenges. Although a higher grant rate of prosecutorial
strikes would not in and of itself denote judicial bias, it could also be evidence of more
favorable treatment to the prosecution.
0o Cf Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (mandating deference to trial judges'
determinations at step three of the Batson inquiry in light of the need to evaluate the credibility
and demeanor of both the juror being challenged and the attorney making the strike).
102 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ("The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the
peremptory satisfies the rule that 'to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice"' (citation omitted)); Underwood, supra note 76, at 771-72;
Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Jury in A Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REv. 808, 829 (1989) (on impor-
tance of input to the defense, in particular).
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The traditional peremptory strike serves to increase party participation
in the shaping of the jury and hence is sometimes thought to enhance party
confidence in the outcome. When the parties are permitted to strike individ-
ual jurors whom they believe to be predisposed to rule against them, they
may be more likely to accept the legitimacy of the final verdict that the jury
reaches.103 This acceptance of legitimacy is particularly important for the
criminal defendant, who is impacted most coercively by the jury's verdict,3 "
and whose acceptance of its legitimacy serves the underlying retributive and
utilitarian purposes behind criminal punishment itself.
The narrative that the peremptory strike increases legitimacy through
party participation, however, is undermined by its historical misuse to di-
minish racial diversity on the jury. Although the defendant may perceive
some increased legitimacy through her own ability to strike jurors she dis-
likes, if the net effect of peremptory challenges is to make juries less diverse,
the harm to the trial's legitimacy will vastly outweigh any participatory bene-
fits - particularly for minority defendants. When, as in the case of Timothy
Foster, a prosecutor is able to leverage peremptory strikes to secure an all-
white jury that then convicts a black defendant and sentences him to death,
05
the peremptory strike undoubtedly diminishes the defendant's confidence in
the outcome, as well as public confidence'06 in the fair administration of the
criminal justice system.
The hybrid strike would provide some, but lesser, control to the parties
in shaping the jury. Although each party's level of control would be re-
duced, thereby frustrating some degree of confidence that each party holds
in the outcome, that confidence-deficit would be offset by the fact that the
other party's level of control was also reduced. And, importantly, if the hy-
brid strike would make it more difficult to exclude jurors on the basis of
race, the harm to legitimacy caused by racially-skewed juries would be miti-
gated.07 By limiting both parties' degree of control over the jury composi-
tion, but still allowing some strikes of jurors that were not excluded for
cause, the interest in party confidence would be better served than under the
pure peremptory regime.
103 See Underwood, supra note 76, at 771-72.
' See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doc-
trine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 561 (1986); Smith, supra note 74, at
1184.
05 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742-43 (2016). See supra notes 1-5 & accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the facts.
106 See King, supra note 41, at 1184.
0o7 Of course, other factors that lead to the racial skewing of juries may still persist, such
as unrepresentative venires, differential impact of hardship challenges and cause challenges,
and so forth. My claim is not that hybrid strikes are a panacea for racial disparities in jury
selection, but rather an important improvement.
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C. Imposing ex ante rationality
While preserving, in modified form, the interests in penumbral protec-
tion against juror bias and party confidence in the outcome, the hybrid sys-
tem would end the practice of irrational and unexplained exclusion. Hybrid
strikes would require ex ante articulation of meaningful reasons for their
exercise in all cases and so would diminish reliance on stereotypes - in-
cluding but not limited to those based on race and gender.10
Under the traditional peremptory strike system, unless a prima facie
case of impermissible discrimination is set out at Batson's first step, peremp-
tory strikes may be exercised for any reason (or no reason) and without
explication. The embrace of unarticulated irrationality creates several signif-
icant problems of equal protection.
The first problem is that of irrational government action - and this
problem persists regardless of whether the strike is racially motivated. Ra-
tionality is the touchstone of equal protection law when suspect or quasi-
suspect class is not at issue.'09 Traditional peremptory challenges may fail to
satisfy even this low standard. Peremptory strikes are anti-rational: they
were traditionally celebrated for their arbitrariness.110 But how can arbitrari-
ness be compatible with equal protection, even when strikes are not exer-
cised on the basis of race or gender?"'
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Batson, identified precisely this in-
compatibility, though he would have preserved the peremptory challenge at
the expense of equal protection. He wrote:
[U]nadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable
to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case. A
clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government ac-
tions has no application to "'an arbitrary and capricious right,' "; a
constitutional principle that may invalidate state action on the ba-
108 I do not suggest that hybrid jury strikes would entirely eliminate the risk of pretext,
however, and I explain below in Part EI.C how a Batson-like framework should be applied on
top of the hybrid strike system as an additional protection against discrimination.
10 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
10 4 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346-47 ("But in criminal cases, or at least
in capital ones, there is, in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious
species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without shewing any cause at all; which is
called a peremptory challenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners,
for which our English laws are justly famous."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[P]eremptory challenges are often lodged, of necessity, for rea-
sons 'normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race,
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.' Moreover,
in making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on
only limited information or hunch. The process cannot be indicted on the sole basis that such
decisions are made on the basis of 'assumption' or 'intuitive judgment."' (citations omitted)).
" "The Equal Protection Clause forbids the arbitrary classification of human beings, and
peremptory challenges are inherently arbitrary. Even when exercised on grounds other than
race, these challenges are unconstitutional." Alschuler, supra note 8, at 170.
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sis of "stereotypic notions," does not explain the breadth of a pro-
cedure exercised on the "'sudden impressions and unaccountable
prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures
of another.' "112
The hybrid jury strike would enforce rationality and equal protection
where it was previously lacking. This requirement of rationality is important
not only for its own sake, but also because the irrationality of the peremptory
strike provides cover for impermissible racism and sexism. And thus arises
the second equal protection problem with the unarticulated irrationality of
the peremptory strike: it frustrates the detection and eradication of impermis-
sible racial and gender bias. It is enormously difficult to identify peremptory
strikes that are based on race when they can be justified on grounds that are
legitimately flimsy - even though race may be a more believable reason.
Permissible irrationality obscures impermissible discrimination.
Thus, to make real headway in reducing the pretextual reliance on mini-
mally plausible race-neutral reasons, all peremptory strikes must be rational,
not only those strikes for which a prima facie case of discrimination can be
raised. Some commentators have suggested simply strengthening the neces-
sary showing of rationality at step two or three of Batson to require some-
thing more than simply a "race-neutral" reason."' Yet it is difficult to
impose this requirement when there is otherwise no obligation to exercise
peremptory strikes for "good" reasons.
Thus the hybrid strike's strong enforcement of rationality would make it
more difficult to shield racial bias from discovery. Moreover, the require-
ment that such reasons be articulated before the strike is exercised would
provide further protection against bias where Batson has failed. Ex ante
reason-giving in all cases would serve several important purposes. First, it
would sidestep the requirement that the moving party establish a prima facie
case of discrimination (step one of the Batson test) - a requirement that
insulates discriminatory strikes from attack "unless the challenges are . . .
flagrant" in their discrimination.114 Second, it would serve a self-filtering
function. In the current system, parties may strike venire members with no
well-formed reason in their mind other than a conscious or implicit categori-
zation based on race and simply hope or expect that they will get away with
it - that the strike will go unchallenged and stay under their opponent's
112 Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
'3 See supra note 83.
114 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("At Batson's first step, litigants remain free to
misuse peremptory challenges as long as the strikes fall below the prima facie threshold level."
(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring)). Although since Batson, the Court
has clarified that the first step is not intended to be overly "onerous" and that "a defendant
satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the
trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred," Johnson v. California, 545
U.S. 162, 170 (2005), there still must be concrete evidence of discrimination in order to
proceed.
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radar."' Ex ante reason-giving would mitigate this type of risk-taking and
prevent attorneys from even attempting to strike jurors when they lack confi-
dence that they can credibly defend the strike. Third, the articulation re-
quirement would change the attorneys' orientation. Instead of legitimating
stereotypes and encouraging lawyers to act on them, the hybrid strike regime
would direct attorneys - including prosecutors - toward evaluating jurors
in terms that might satisfy the cause standard.
Ex ante articulation of reasons also ameliorates, though does not fully
remedy, the problem of implicit bias in the exercise of peremptory strikes.
By requiring attorneys to point in advance to concrete and substantial facts
suggesting the partiality of the juror they wish to strike, hybrid strikes would
prevent attorneys from relying solely on their instinctual feeling about that
juror - an instinctual feeling that might be largely determined by their la-
tent biases. Scholarship on implicit bias in various contexts, from criminal
law to employment law to immigration law, has noted that implicit bias is
particularly likely to lead to discriminatory behavior when individuals are
given discretion to act without needing to provide reasons for their actions
and with little accountability.116 This is particularly true of good-faith actors
who do not knowingly seek to discriminate."'7 Giving reasons ahead of time
forces attorneys to deliberate and experience accountability before they
strike the juror rather than afterwards, when they may attempt to defensively
rationalize a discriminatory strike."8
I do not claim that hybrid strikes would eliminate the effects of implicit
bias altogether, because the reasons articulated for the hybrid strikes might
"' This idea is supported by evidence that few litigants actually bring Batson challenges
notwithstanding widespread discrimination. See Baldus, supra note 18, at 123.
H6 See Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 487 (2010) ("[Tihe accountability literature reveals that individ-
uals who must explain their decisionmaking to others are less prone to various biases."); Kang,
supra note 48, at 1142 (citation omitted) ("[T]he conditions under which implicit biases trans-
late most readily into discriminatory behavior are when people have wide discretion in making
quick decisions with little accountability. Prosecutors function in just such environments.");
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 414 (2016) ("Research in the social
sciences demonstrates that pausing to think through or articulate a reason for an action limits
the effects of implicit biases on that action."); Fatma E. Marouf, The Unconstitutional Use of
Restraints in Removal Proceedings, 67 BAYLOR L. REv. 214, 244 (2015) ("When judges are
exercising discretion, they often do not go through the exercise of explaining their reasoning,
which eliminates one of the checks on implicit bias. Just as trial court judges have been found
to rely more on intuitive processing when they have greater discretion and less when bound by
a web of rules, immigration judges operating in the arena of discretion are more likely to
express implicit attitudes").
"' See supra note 69 & accompanying text (noting that even people whose conscious
views are egalitarian may harbor implicit biases).
Is See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 257 (1999) ("Both cognitive dissonance theory and impression
management heory predict that after people have irrevocably committed themselves to a deci-
sion, learning of the need to justify their actions will motivate cognitive effort - but this effort
will be directed toward self-justification rather than self-criticism. . . . (P]ostdecisional ac-




themselves be shaped by implicit bias. Researchers have explained that we
tend to interpret other people's behavior in ways that confirm our uncon-
scious stereotypes."' For example, imagine that a police officer harbors an
implicit bias that African-Americans are prone to violence. Imagine, further,
that the police officer observes an African-American exhibiting certain be-
havior - say, reaching to take something out of his pocket. The police
officer may interpret that behavior in a manner consistent with her uncon-
scious belief - in other words, as evidence of imminent violence that might
justify self-defense by the police officer. The very same gesture by a Cauca-
sian person may be perceived as non-threatening. And, if the police officer
is asked to articulate the basis for her perception of hostility, he can point to
the behavior that led to suspicion, without even realizing that implicit bias
shaped her perception of the behavior's significance.120 Similarly, attorneys
may interpret jurors' behavior in ways consistent with their implicit biases,
such that they can truthfully articulate concrete facts that led them to doubt
the juror's impartiality, without even realizing that their interpretation of
those facts is itself a product of implicit bias.121 Nevertheless, even though it
may not wholly solve the problem of implicit bias, ex ante reason-giving
does push back against it by forcing attorneys away from purely impression-
istic and largely unaccountable decision-making.
Thus, the hybrid strike offers important improvements over the peremp-
tory strike in its enforcement of ex ante rationality. Some defenders of the
peremptory challenge will argue that requiring attorneys to articulate reasons
in all cases, and requiring that those arguments provide meaningful grounds
for a cause challenge, rids peremptories of their historical value.122 Yet Bat-
son itself has already limited the assumption that peremptory strikes will
never require an articulation of reasons.123 More fundamentally, the right to
"9 See, e.g., Page, supra note 69, at 207-11.
120 See L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 INo. L.J.
1143, 1155 (2012) ("In sum, implicit biases may cause officers not only to pay more attention
to Blacks than to Whites, but also to interpret identical acts differently based upon the race of
the individual performing them. This demonstrates that an officer's suspicions are not necessa-
rily based solely upon the ambiguous actions he observes. Consequently, the articulation re-
quirement does not prevent actions based upon racial hunches caused by implicit bias."); L.
Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 267, 278-79 (2012).
121 See Page, supra note 69, at 228-29.
122 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986) (Burger, C.J. dissenting) (em-
phasizing the historical importance of "unexplained peremptories . . . as a means to strengthen
our jury system" and quoting Professor Barbara Babcock's defense of the peremptory chal-
lenge, which "'avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes"' and which
"'allows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not."'
(quoting Babcock, supra note 76, at 553-54)).
23 Albert Alschuler wrote critically of the explicated, but still irrational, peremptory strike
that came into existence after Batson. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 200. See also Underwood,
supra note 76, at 762-63.
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achieve a desired jury composition through stereotyping is not worth its sub-
stantial costs - nor is it consistent with equal protection.12 4
III. REFLECTIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION
A. The choice of forum
There are two possible avenues for implementation of the hybrid strike
regime: legislative reform (at either the federal or state level) or judicial
decree.
First, Congress and, more likely, individual state legislatures, could re-
form their statutory schemes to replace traditional peremptories with hybrid
strikes. The Supreme Court has made it clear that "peremptory challenges
are not of federal constitutional dimension"125 and that "[s]tates may with-
hold peremptory challenges 'altogether without impairing the constitutional
guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.'" 126 Thus, federal and state
governments may certainly reform, without entirely eliminating, peremptory
challenges in any way otherwise consistent with the Constitution.
The legislative avenue would bring the benefits of gradual implementa-
tion: In the model of experimentation extolled by Justice Brandeis,127 an indi-
vidual state legislature could enact this reform as a pilot program, providing
an opportunity to assess its success before it was mandated or emulated else-
where. Moreover, there may currently be momentum to achieve such a leg-
islative reform, with increased popular and political scrutiny into race and
the criminal justice system.128 In particular, reformers in a state with a docu-
mented history of disparate use of peremptory strikes against minorities
could point to the concrete problem and take the lead in attempting a new
approach, and subsequently study whether the racial composition of juries
had improved as a result.
Alternatively, the Supreme Courtl29 could decide, as a prophylactic
measure to enforce equal protection, that no peremptory strikes would be
permitted unless the proponent of the strike first provided meaningful rea-
sons for its exercise. This constitutional limitation on the peremptory strike
would, in turn, require the states and federal government to either eliminate
124 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 201-03; Batson, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (1986) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
125 Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152 (2009) (quoting United States v. Marti-
nez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000)).
126 Id. (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992)).
127 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
128 See supra notes 41-45 & accompanying text.
129 Individual state supreme courts, of course, could also interpret their own state constitu-
tional equal protection guarantees to prohibit traditional peremptory strikes.
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the peremptory strike altogether or institute some form of hybrid strike
regime.
There are at least two theories under which such a judicial outcome
could occur. First, the Court could conclude that peremptory strikes as cur-
rently exercised violate the rights of jurors under an equal protection analy-
sis upon rationality review, without ever touching upon the issue of race or
gender. As government actions negatively impacting individuals' interests
must be rational,13 0 the "arbitrary and capricious" peremptory strike in its
traditional form is inherently in tension with the constitutional rights of ju-
rors, because it may be exercised irrationally on a whim, hunch, or stereo-
type, rather than a reasoned basis.13 ' Indeed, it is precisely this irrationality
which made the peremptory such a treasured practice by some who have
historically supported it. 132 Requiring ex ante reason-giving would, at bot-
tom, enforce rationality. A hybrid model would ensure that jurors would not
be struck without a legitimate reason, even if that reason would not be ade-
quate to prevail on a challenge for cause. Granted, the Court might choose,
instead, to change the standard of the peremptory strike to satisfy rationality
review but not to require articulation of those reasons unless the opposing
side challenged the strike's rationality. And the Court might choose a
slightly different standard - such as a "rational" basis for the strike, rather
than a "non-frivolous" or "substantial" ground for a cause challenge. How-
ever, it would be within the Court's power to rule that peremptory challenges
as currently practiced violate equal protection and to mandate reason-giving
in order to prophylactically ensure their rationality.
Second, the Supreme Court could require ex ante, meaningful reason-
giving in an acknowledgement hat Batson has failed to remedy the problem
of race-based peremptory strikes. Recognizing that race-conscious peremp-
tory strikes too often satisfy the minimal standards set forth in Batson, the
Court could conclude that Batson is insufficient to protect against equal pro-
tection violations and could instead require a stronger showing of race-neu-
trality through the articulation of a weightier interest for the strike. Again, it
is possible that the Court would only modify step two of the Batson inquiry,
strengthening the necessary showing of race-neutral reasons, but only after a
prima facie case of discrimination had been made out. However, for the
reasons articulated above, the requirement of ex ante reason-giving would
provide important additional protections against discrimination. And man-
dating this type of ex ante reason-giving to root out impermissible discrimi-
nation would be well within the Court's legitimate authority. In other
contexts, most famously, in Miranda v. Arizona,'3 3 the Court has required
procedural mechanisms in order to protect a constitutional guarantee too eas-
30 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
3 See supra notes 109-111 & accompanying text.
132 See id.
133 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
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ily evaded without them.134 Batson itself requires reason-giving where none
was previously necessary;135 hybrid strikes would simply require that reason-
giving occur at a different point in time and for all strikes. Justices Marshall
and Breyer have already suggested that the Court may ban peremptory
strikes altogether in order to enforce equal protection.'36 Modifying peremp-
tory strikes to ensure rationality and protect against equal protection viola-
tions would be a feasible midpoint between that extreme and the current
status quo.
B. The hybrid standard
Calibrating the standard for a successful strike - and judicial adher-
ence to the standard set - is of considerable importance. If the standard for
granting a hybrid strike is too permissive, it would lead us back toward arbi-
trary peremptory challenges, with a heightened risk of discrimination - al-
though, due to the requirement of ex ante reason-giving, there would likely
still be some beneficial self-censorship. If the standard is too stringent, we
would see an increased risk that genuinely biased jurors might make it onto
the jury, diminishing the penumbral value of the hybrid strike. Rather than
presenting one standard as the necessary approach to take in order to achieve
the goals of the hybrid strike system, I will propose two reasonable contend-
ers, with the recognition that the preferred standard will depend on the value
preferences of the enacting jurisdiction.
One possible standard would allow for the exercise of a hybrid strike
any time the court rejected a non-frivolous cause challenge. This is a fairly
permissive standard that could be developed through reference to case law
on Rule 11 sanctions. Courts in this context have defined "frivolous" as
"when the result is obvious or when the . . . argument is wholly without
merit." 3 7 The word "frivolous" has been "used to denote a filing that is
both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.""' Its
touchstone is "objective unreasonableness."'39 When involving factual alle-
gations, those allegations must be "utterly lacking in support," not merely
"weak" and "unlikely to prevail." 40
134 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (discussing prophylactic nature of
Miranda warnings).
1 See Underwood, supra note 76, at 762-63.
36 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Miller-El
v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
1 Dadd v. Anoka Cty., 827 F.3d 749, 757 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Horton v. Conklin,
431 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 130 F.3d 302,
305 (8th Cir. 1997))).
1' Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990).
13 Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000).




It would be possible for a cause challenge to be frivolous because of
either legal or factual insufficiency. If an attorney sought to challenge a
juror for cause based on reasons that either misrepresented or were not sup-
ported by the record (as, for example, occurred in Fosterl41), the challenge
would fail due to the frivolous factual allegations. If an attorney sought to
challenge a juror on the basis of a characteristic that was factually supported
by the record, but that could not reasonably suggest bias or disqualification
as a legal matter, that strike would also be frivolous. For example, if there
was a factual basis for concluding that a potential juror lived in a high-crime
neighborhood, a judge may nonetheless deny as frivolous a challenge based
on that fact, holding that it would be unreasonable to conclude, based merely
on the neighborhood in which one lived, that the juror would be biased or
was otherwise disqualified.
On the other hand, if a juror stated, and then retracted, a biased view-
point, the judge could reasonably conclude that the cause challenge was not
frivolous. For example, suppose that a juror stated her belief that police only
arrest people who are guilty. When rehabilitated by the prosecution, she
agreed that she could follow the law that a defendant is innocent until proven
guilty, and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. If challenged for cause, a judge would likely deny the motion,
because the juror retracted her initially expressed viewpoint and agreed to
act lawfully. But the judge could reasonably find a sufficient basis in the
record for concluding, as a factual matter, that the juror was unlikely to hold
the prosecution to its burden of proof and that, as a legal matter, such an
orientation if true could compromise the juror's impartiality. A hybrid strike
would therefore be permissible.
An alternative, stricter standard would require the proponent of the
strike to provide a substantial basis for a cause challenge upon which rea-
sonable judges could reach different rulings. This standard would be akin to
a "near miss" approach. It would bring to mind the substantial showing that
must be made under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in
order to obtain a certificate of appealability. The Supreme Court recently
articulated this standard as follows:
A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."
That standard is met when "reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner." Obtaining a certificate of
appealability "does not require a showing that the appeal will suc-
ceed," and "a court of appeals should not decline the application
141 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016).
2017] 385
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
. . . merely because it believes the applicant will not demonstrate
an entitlement to relief."1 42
Requiring this substantial showing of cause to exclude the juror as the
predicate for a hybrid strike would set a more demanding standard than sim-
ply requiring a non-frivolous basis. It is difficult to point definitively to a
canonical class of challenges that would satisfy the non-frivolous standard
but not the substantial basis standard, as judicial rulings on for-cause chal-
lenges are often highly fact-intensive and not amenable to bright-line rules.
But imagine, for example, that a juror's parent served in law enforcement,
and the defense sought to exclude that juror for cause. A judge might con-
clude, in denying the challenge for cause, that it was not frivolous, but
neither was it substantial. In this scenario, the defense would be permitted to
exercise a hybrid strike under the non-frivolous standard, but not under the
substantial basis standard.
As a result, if the substantial basis standard were adopted instead of the
non-frivolous standard, there would be fewer "false positives" - jurors ex-
cluded who were not in fact biased - and there would be less room for
pretext and impermissible discrimination. At the same time, the penumbral
function of the peremptory strike would be weakened because it would be
harder to secure a ruling from a judge authorizing the use of a peremptory
challenge.
My preference would be for the stricter standard, in light of the troub-
ling history that we have seen with discriminatory use of peremptory strikes
and the concern that a weaker standard might collapse back toward the tradi-
tional peremptory model. It seems, however, that either standard would be a
substantial improvement over the status quo in the traditional peremptory
regime. Either one would serve to preserve the penumbral function while
discouraging peremptory challenges based on gut instinct and unsubstanti-
ated stereotypes.143
C. The new Batson
Even under the stronger formulation, requiring a substantial showing of
bias or disqualification, a regime of hybrid strikes would not eliminate the
142 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263-64 (2016) (citations omitted).
143 It may be helpful here to consider Barbara Underwood's typology of permissible ratio-
nales for exercising peremptory challenges. See Underwood, supra note 76, at 762-64. She
identified the first two rationales as "imperfect" challenges for cause: first, when a juror
stated, but then retracted, a biased viewpoint; and second, when a juror's group membership
other than race or gender, such as occupation, suggested a higher probability of bias. Id. at
762-63. The third rationale, which she deemed least significant, was when an attorney chose,
on a non-race-based whim, to exclude a juror. Id. at 763-64. In any conception of the hybrid
system, this third type of peremptory strike would be eliminated. Precisely how many "imper-
fect" challenges for cause in the first two categories would be allowed would depend on the




possibility of pretextual, discriminatory strikes. While mandating ex ante
articulation of meaningful reasons for the strike would make it more difficult
to strike jurors based on race or gender, it would not make it impossible to
do so, and some form of Batson challenge would still need to be available.
There are at least four ways in which discrimination could still imper-
missibly enter the hybrid strike framework. The first is through disparate
questioning. During voir dire, an attorney may question venire members of
different races differentially - consciously or unconsciously searching for
reasons to legitimate the strike of a juror of a particular race." Imagine, for
example, that in a drug case, the prosecutor only perfunctorily questioned
white venire members about the war on drugs while intensively questioning
black venire members about the same subject matter and then used the infor-
mation obtained to justify hybrid strikes against some or all of them. Each
hybrid strike would be technically justified but the pattern of questioning
would evidence pretext.
Second, an attorney may challenge for cause venire members of one
race while not challenging venire members of another race, even though the
same grounds for a challenge were present on the record. In challenging
jurors disparately, the attorney would only receive judicial authorization to
exercise hybrid strikes against jurors of one race. Using the drug case above
as an example, imagine that the prosecution questioned jurors of all races
about their qualms about drug criminalization; that some of these venire
members, black and white, expressed their belief that no one should go to
jail for drug possession; but that when rehabilitated by the judge or defense,
they all professed their ability to follow the law and convict if the facts
warranted it. Suppose, then, that the prosecutor only moved to strike the
black jurors for cause. If the judge denied these challenges, but ruled that
they were non-frivolous, the prosecutor might move forward to exercise hy-
brid strikes only against the black jurors, despite the presence of similarly
situated white jurors.
Third, an attorney may exercise hybrid strikes disproportionately
against venire members of one race, even though the judge had ruled that
there were adequate grounds for a hybrid strike against jurors of all races.
Thus imagine that the same prosecutor did challenge for cause all those who
expressed qualms about drug criminalization, that the judge did rule that all
could be struck with hybrid strikes, but that when the time came to exercise
those strikes, the prosecutor only or disproportionately struck the minority
jurors. This scenario introduces the complication of scarce resources into
the discrimination inquiry. While cause challenges are unlimited, hybrid
strikes are not. An attorney who has a set number of hybrid strikes must
"4 This type of disparate questioning may be evidence of discrimination under the current
Batson regime. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 344 (2003). See also Page, supra
note 69, at 218 (citing examples of court recognition of disparate questioning as evidence of
discrimination and explaining how implicit bias can lead to disparate questioning).
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exercise them strategically and may be unable to strike every juror against
whom there are adequate grounds. The process of prioritization might re-
flect discrimination, or it might be based on some other legitimate rationale.
Fourth, the attorney may exercise hybrid strikes for reasons that are
formally race-neutral, but are so closely correlated with race that they may in
fact be a proxy for race. For example, suppose a prosecutor in Ferguson,
Missouri, asked each juror during voir dire whether he or she had exper-
ienced any negative interactions with law enforcement. In a jurisdiction in
which, "[d]espite making up 67% of the population, African Americans
accounted for 85% of . .. traffic stops, 90% of . .. citations, and 93% of ...
arrests from 2012 to 2014,"l45 and in which African-Americans experienced
"almost 90%" of excessive force by the police,146 it would be highly proba-
ble that many more black than white jurors would answer "yes" to that
formally race-neutral question.
Even without obviously engaging in these four practices, a party may
exercise her strikes in such a disproportionate manner against members of
one race that an inference of discrimination would arise. If, for example, the
prosecutor exercised ten of her twelve hybrid strikes against African-Ameri-
cans when the venire was only 30% African-American, this absolute statisti-
cal disparity would be evidence of discrimination, even without strong
evidence of disparate questioning or disparate use of cause challenges or
hybrid strikes against similarly-situated individuals.
Thus we can see that the hybrid strike regime by itself would not pro-
tect fully against the race-based exercise of peremptory strikes, and we can
recognize that an additional protection would remain necessary. With these
scenarios in mind, we can begin to map out how Batson could be modified
to fit the context of the hybrid strike system.
The requirement of ex ante reason-giving that defines the hybrid jury
strike system leads to a natural simplification and streamlining of the ex-
isting Batson test. At present, step one of the Batson test (a prima facie case
of discrimination) is necessary to trigger the inquiry at step two (race-neutral
reason-giving).147 But under a hybrid strike regime, the need for steps one
and two melts away, as the judge must rule prior to the exercise of every
strike that it is supported by a non-frivolous or substantial and race-neutral
reason. Thus, in a hybrid regime, the moving party challenging a strike
would proceed directly to make her case that the already-delineated reasons
for the strike were pretextual.
In so doing, the moving party would be able to present evidence of
discrimination such as that described above: patterns of disparate question-
ing, disparate attempts to challenge for cause similarly-situated jurors of dif-
ferent races, disparate exercise of hybrid strikes against similarly-situated
14 DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 62.
146 Id. at 28.
'4 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016).
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jurors of different races, use of hybrid strikes for reasons closely correlated
with race, and overall disproportionate exercise of strikes against members
of one race. The moving party could also point to other evidence of race-
consciousness revealed in the proceedings as a whole, as well as past pat-
terns of race discrimination by the attorney or the office in which she works.
The judge would then allow the non-moving party to respond, after
which, taking into account all evidence, including the credibility of the strik-
ing party, the judge would ultimately rule as to whether the Batson movant
had satisfied her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. And, al-
though the nonmoving party could try to explain differential exercise of a
scarce resource against members of one race by pointing to previously unar-
ticulated facts, the justification for the strike itself would be limited to the
reasons provided ex ante.
Even in this modified Batson regime, Batson challenges still may often
be unsuccessful. In order to prevail, the moving party would likely have to
establish a highly suspicious pattern of behavior by the striking attorney
against members of one race or gender, because every individual strike
would by definition be justified by a substantial reason for exclusion. How-
ever, Batson would be a more streamlined tool, without the cumbersome
three-step analysis, and it would be able to focus with more precision upon
the ex ante reasons for the strike when assessing claims of discrimination.
And the combination of ex ante articulation and the modified Batson regime
would make it more difficult to shield racial motivations from judicial
detection.
D. Asymmetrical applications
Some commentators have argued persuasively that traditional peremp-
tory strikes should be allocated to the prosecution and defense on an asym-
metrical basis. Most ambitiously, some have advocated abolishing the
prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges, while retaining peremptory
strikes for the defense. Against the background of rampant and seemingly
intractable prosecutorial misconduct and judicial orientation against criminal
defendants, some argue that the peremptory strike is a necessary and legiti-
macy-enhancing tool for the defendant, but is both non-essential and persist-
ently abused when leveraged by the state.148 There is considerable normative
and historical support for asymmetrical abolition.149
My primary critique of asymmetrical abolition is one of feasibility. As
much opposition as there has been to the idea of eliminating peremptory
strikes altogether, an approach that would only eliminate peremptory strikes
1
4 8 See Smith, supra note 74, at 1164-65.
1 See Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1148 ("There is ample historical precedent for the
allotment of peremptories to defendants but not to the government.").
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for prosecutors may be impossible to achieve.150 Even Justice Marshall, a
staunch champion of criminal defendants' rights and a strong skeptic of the
peremptory strike system, did not place too much stock in the feasibility or
equity of asymmetrical abolition.'
Hybrid strikes, however, may provide opportunities for softer asymmet-
rical applications that might more feasibly enhance important values of im-
partiality, race-neutrality, and legitimacy. I discuss here several variations
on the hybrid strike model that would achieve some of the goals advanced
by proponents of asymmetrical abolition without its stark disparity and re-
sulting pragmatic difficulties.
These moderate asymmetrical applications would also alleviate one of
the primary critiques that I would anticipate from the criminal defense com-
munity against the hybrid strike model: the risk that a judge who is more
sympathetic to the prosecution than to the defense will assess the merits of
hybrid strikes more favorably when exercised by prosecutors than by de-
fendants.'5 2 If prosecutorial hybrid strikes were accepted as non-frivolous,
while equally-meritorious defense strikes were rejected as frivolous, the de-
fense could be stripped of all the corrective benefits of the peremptory chal-
lenge"' and saddled with all its deficiencies, with little recourse on appeal.15 4
Incorporating some measure of asymmetry into the hybrid strike model
could protect against his scenario of judicial asymmetry in enforcement.
The first two asymmetrical models would modify the strong suggestion
of abolishing peremptory strikes only for the prosecution. Under one model,
the defense would be permitted to exercise traditional peremptory strikes,
while the prosecution would be limited to hybrid strikes, rather than no
strikes at all. This approach would be more politically feasible than elimi-
nating prosecutorial peremptories altogether, and would incorporate the ben-
efits of ex ante rule-giving specifically for prosecutors, whose racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes has a long and particularly
damaging history. It would also alleviate the concerns that have been raised
about eliminating traditional peremptory strikes for the defense and thereby
ceding control over a traditional mechanism to enhance the impartiality of
the jury.
"5o See Anna Roberts, Asymmetry As Fairness: Reversing A Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1503, 1542 (2015) ("[D]espite its theoretical appeal, [asymmetrical abolition]
seems unlikely as a practical matter. Prosecutors, like other litigators, appear to be addicted to
the peremptory challenge and are ready and able to lobby for its retention.").
151 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Our
criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also
from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be
evenly held.' We can maintain that balance . . . by banning the use of peremptory challenges
by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant's peremptories as well.").
52 See supra note 95.
" For discussions of the importance of the peremptory challenge to the defense, see, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 74, at 1175-78; Ogletree, supra note 74, at 1147-48.
154 As explained supra notes 96-97 & accompanying text, the standard of review of rul-
ings on hybrid strikes would almost necessarily be highly deferential.
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Another modified model of asymmetrical abolition would be to permit
the defense to exercise hybrid strikes and to limit the prosecution to cause
challenges. Under this model, the persistent problem of race-based per-
emptories by prosecutors would come to an end. Prosecutors would be de-
nied even hybrid strikes, in recognition that they would still be able to skew
the jury on racial lines by providing formally race-neutral reasons for hybrid
or peremptory strikes such as distrust of the police that are closely correlated
with race. And defendants would face some limitations, as well: They
would not be allowed the unfettered discretion permitted by traditional per-
emptory strikes. Yet defendants would retain a safety valve for unduly nar-
row judicial rulings on cause challenges - the hybrid strikes would
preserve the penumbral protection of the defendant's constitutionally guaran-
teed right to an impartial jury.
Even if these approaches were rejected and both sides were allowed to
exercise hybrid strikes, there would be ways to allocate or assess those
strikes asymmetrically to promote overall fairness and discourage
prosecutorial abuse. One asymmetrical application would be an unequal dis-
tribution of hybrid strikes to the prosecution and defense. There is a long
historical basis for allocating more peremptory strikes to the defense than to
the prosecution,' and although there has been a trend away from asymme-
try in recent years,'5 6 multiple jurisdictions currently allocate more peremp-
tory strikes to the defense than to the prosecution."' It would be sensible to
continue and/or return to that approach by similarly allocating more hybrid
strikes to the defense.58
Another possibility is that both sides may be permitted to exercise hy-
brid jury strikes, but the standard for a successful prosecution strike would
exceed the standard for successful defense strike. Perhaps the defense
would be permitted to exercise a hybrid strike on the basis of any non-frivo-
lous but unsuccessful cause challenge, while the prosecution would need to
satisfy a higher standard of a "substantial" challenge upon which rational
jurists could disagree.
Relatedly, it would be possible to categorically eliminate certain types
of rationales as adequate bases for a hybrid strike. In particular, formally
race-neutral but practically race-correlated reasons - such as distrust of or
negative interactions with law enforcement - could be eliminated as legiti-
mate bases for a hybrid strike.'5 9 More broadly, there could be good reason
155 See Roberts, supra note 150, at 1533-35 (tracing asymmetrical allocations of peremp-
tory strikes to the government and defense from fourteenth century England to mid-twentieth
century America).
'56 See id. at 1536-37.
'5 See, e.g., FED. R. CRI. P. 24(b)(2) (allowing the government six peremptory chal-
lenges and the defense ten peremptory challenges in non-capital felony cases).
'5 See Roberts, supra note 150, at 1507.
'5 Cf Johnson, supra note 68, at 391 (arguing that, on account of racial disparities in
arrest rates, "questions about arrests during voir dire should be precluded, as should the prac-
tice of using a person's arrest record as the sole basis for the exercise of peremptory strikes.").
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to eliminate "distrust of government" as a basis for the exercise of a hybrid
strike, in light of the structural and historical role of the jury within our
democratic system. The jury's institutional role is to serve as a safeguard of
individual liberty against tyrannical government.'60 The jury's constitutional
status evidences the Founders' recognition that an unchecked government is
susceptible to overreaching. Excluding jurors from service on the basis of
their experiences with precisely that type of government overreach disserves
the fundamental purpose of the jury itself. A jury stripped of members who
have experienced draconian law enforcement tactics firsthand would under-
mine the jury's success in its role as a communitarian check against govern-
ment excess.
These asymmetrical permutations, and others, display the flexibility
with which the hybrid jury strike model could be implemented. The hybrid
jury strike is a tool that can be deployed to modify the existing peremptory
strike model in varying ways and to varying degrees. At the intersection of a
cause challenge and a peremptory challenge, the hybrid jury strike can be
used to soften some of the either-or alternatives presented by efforts to re-
form the traditional model.
E. Overlapping reforms
The hybrid jury strike may be layered on top of other reform initiatives
to strengthen their chances of success at achieving neutrality, diversity, and
impartiality. The hybrid strike is not a panacea; racial discrimination in jury
selection has thus far been an intractable problem, and I do not claim that the
hybrid strike regime would completely eradicate it. However, the hybrid
strike's salutary effects would increase if paired with other reform efforts to
maximize the representativeness of juries.
Take, for example, Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui's idea of jural district-
ing, akin to electoral districting, which he summarized as follows:
[T]his method divides a jury district into twelve sub-districts,
drawn around "communities of interest," and requires that each
petit jury contain one juror from each sub-district. Drawing on
electoral districting experience, such a selection method would
tend to create more consistently diverse juries than do current se-
lection procedures that select jurors on an "at large" basis."6 '
This is a fascinating proposal worthy of consideration. It does have some
weaknesses: for one, the drawing of district lines can itself be subject to
manipulation to satisfy the line-drawer's racial and political preferences, as
iso E.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168, (2009) ("The rule's animating principle is the
preservation of the jury's historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the
trial for an alleged offense."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1968) (recounting
the historical significance of the jury).
'6' Forde-Mazrui, supra note 86, at 359-60.
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has been amply shown by the long history of racial and political gerryman-
dering in electoral districting.16 2 Yet the proposal's insight and promise are
significant. Juries are intended to represent an entire community. By select-
ing a jury in such a way as to ensure representation across the entire geo-
graphical span of the district, we would make it more likely that the jury
contained voices from the entire community, in all of its racial, political, and
economic diversity - including from the defendant's own sub-community.
However, one difficulty with Forde-Mazrui's proposal is that peremp-
tory strikes could threaten to eradicate much of the diversity that jural dis-
tricting hopes to achieve. Imagine that a jury district that is 25% black was
further divided into twelve sub-districts, with one juror to be selected from
each sub-district. Imagine further that three of these sub-districts (or 25%)
are majority-black. We might hope that the jury representatives from these
majority-black sub-districts would, themselves, be black, thus achieving pro-
portional representation on the jury without employing race quotas that
would be presumptively unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.'63 This representative logic would have a strong chance of success
in the electoral context. Assuming racial bloc voting, the majority-black
electorate in these sub-districts would have the numbers and the power to
elect their representative of choice. Yet, unlike in the majoritarian electoral
context, it is the parties and the judge, not the people of the district, who
select the representative in the jury selection context. And the peremptory
strike endangers the chance that this proposal will actually achieve racial
diversity. If each sub-district is represented by only one juror, and the prose-
cutor is able to leverage her peremptory strikes so that the juror selected
from the majority-minority district is white, then she may be able to effec-
tively strip the sub-districted jury of all, or most, minority participation.
Recognizing the danger to racial diversity posed by peremptory chal-
lenges, Forde-Mazrui suggested that a jurisdiction inclined to implement ju-
ral districting might be amenable to eliminating the peremptory in its
entirety.M That hope aside, Forde-Mazrui asserted that sub-districting
would diminish prosecutorial incentives to exercise peremptory strikes on
the basis of race, because the challenged juror would be replaced with some-
one demographically similar.165 That outcome is possible, but it is also pos-
sible that jural districting would do nothing to change, or might even
increase, prosecutorial incentives to strike jurors on the basis of race.
Imagine now, however, that jural districting was paired with hybrid
jury strikes. The prosecutor would need to articulate, ex ante, substantial -
even if not ultimately disqualifying - reasons for every strike. It would be
162 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274-75 (2004); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640
(1993).
'63 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 86, at 392-93 (analyzing the equal protection problems
posed by racial quotas for juries).
4 See id. at 391.
65 See id. at 391-92.
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much more difficult for prosecutors to undermine the diversifying effects of
the jural districting through the use of pretextual peremptory strikes. Thus,
pairing the hybrid strike reform with another structural reform to jury selec-
tion would improve the chances of securing a diverse jury in practice.
F. The broader voir dire
I anticipate the critique that hybrid jury strikes would take too much
time during an already-cumbersome voir dire process. It is true that hybrid
strikes would require the articulation of reasons ahead of time for every per-
emptory strike and would likely lead to an increased number of for-cause
challenges. I doubt, however, that the net effect would be too burdensome.
To begin with, hybrid jury strikes would likely reduce the amount of time
spent on Batson motions, because substantial reasons would have to be ar-
ticulated for every strike. And, although there may be some increased litiga-
tion over erroneously granted or denied hybrid strikes at the appellate level, I
would expect that it would be offset by a reduction in Batson litigation.
Nor would the hybrid strike system require any particular voir dire pro-
cedure in order to yield improvements over the current system - although I
would argue, as others have, that expanded voir dire is preferable if the de-
sired goal is to seek a truly impartial jury.16 6 Voir dire proceedings vary
dramatically in different states and even in different courtrooms within the
same courthouse.'16 Sometimes judges conduct the voir dire questioning and
sometimes attorneys are permitted to do so; sometimes there is a mixture of
both. Sometimes panels of venire members are questioned together; in other
cases each prospective juror is questioned individually and out of the pres-
ence of the rest of the venire. Sometimes jurors are asked to fill out lengthy
written questionnaires before they are questioned in court. Sometimes the
questioning is expansive, with significant latitude for the attorneys over the
direction and the depth of questioning; sometimes the permissible scope is
carefully curtailed by the judge.
At present, in courtrooms with strictly limited voir dire procedures, per-
emptory challenges are often exercised with little concrete individualized
information about the jurors aside from physically obvious traits such as
race, gender, physical appearance, and manner of dress. Thus, attorneys
must generally resort o stereotypical assumptions in order to exercise their
peremptory strikes. Within this context, implementing the hybrid jury strike
system would likely mean significantly reducing the number of strikes exer-
cised, because little information would be available upon which to base ei-
ther a cause challenge or a hybrid strike. This reduction would be an
'66 See Hans & Jehle, supra note 87, at 1198-1201; Page, supra note 69, at 254 (citing
scholarship).
167 See Hans & Jehle, supra note 87, at 1184-86 (describing variations in voir dire practice
across different states and jurisdictions).
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improvement, because such necessarily stereotypical peremptory strikes
have little value worth saving. When peremptory strikes are exercised
within an information deficit, the risk increases that attorneys will resort to
racial and gender stereotypes in making their choices. The risk also in-
creases that the penumbral function of the peremptory strike is less effective;
there will be more "false positives" and a reduced chance that any given
peremptory strike will actually eliminate a biased juror. Hybrid strikes
would contribute to overall fairness by setting a higher standard for exclud-
ing jurors and limiting strikes in this information-poor context.
By contrast, in expanded voir dire procedures today, peremptory strikes
may be exercised based on individuated information other than race and gen-
der. In an information-rich context, the peremptory strike is more valuable
in promoting fairness and legitimacy because it can be exercised intelli-
gently to eliminate jurors who may truly be biased. Under a hybrid strike
regime, one can also predict that the more expansive the voir dire and the
more information available to the parties, the more attorneys would be able
to establish the factual predicate for a strike, the more frequent the exercise
of the strikes would be, and the more accurate the parties' estimation that a
risk of bias exists. And in an information-rich environment, the loss of the
ability to strike jurors based on hunches and stereotypes seems less signifi-
cant. The parties would have the opportunity to question jurors more thor-
oughly and to genuinely further the interest in jury impartiality.
CONCLUSION
Thirty years of Supreme Court adherence to the Batson framework has
failed to meaningfully protect against discrimination in the exercise of per-
emptory strikes, leading many to call for their abolition. Despite the persua-
sive power of this call, however, there seems to be little movement on the
ground in that direction. This Article suggests a less extreme, and therefore
more palatable, reform: the replacement of traditional peremptory strikes
with hybrid jury strikes, which could only be exercised if the proponent first
articulated reasons coming close to, but not found to satisfy, the standard for
cause challenges. This reform would have important salutary effects by
mandating ex ante rationality, yet preserving in modified form the most im-
portant penumbral function of the peremptory strike. The hybrid strike
would be a flexible tool: It could be achieved through legislative or judicial
action, calibrated to meet different policy objectives, combined with a modi-
fied Batson test, layered on top of other reform proposals, allocated asym-
metrically between prosecutor and defense, and implemented with positive
effect in variously-structured voir dire proceedings. It has the potential to
perform the critical task of translating Batson's ideal of non-discriminatory
jury selection into a more effective and enforceable structural framework.
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